I’ve been boosting arguments in support of the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact (NPVIC), so I thought I’d share an argument against it. Two, in fact. They come from Josh Marshall at Talking Points Memo. First:
Now this is actually within reach because of Democratic trifectas in a handful of states. When I heard this subject come up again, my reaction was both negative and baffled. Given what we have seen in the last decade, who could ever have confidence that a state would honor this process when push came to shove? We’ve seen now how little is truly binding. This is especially the case when you’re expecting courts not to interfere in a case where the laws being enforced really are genuinely non-constitutional if not quite anti-constitutional. If JD Vance wins Wisconsin in 2032 but Wisconsin says it has to award its electoral votes to Pete Buttigieg, some version of this Supreme Court is going to uphold that law? Please.
For me this settles the matter. I would never trust such an expedient to work.
I agree with Marshall that a compact is only as good as its enforcement mechanisms, and the NPVIC relies on each state that adopts it to actually adhere to it, with the courts there to ensure they do. Fortunately, courts have required reluctant states to honor previous interstate compacts, but it’s also true that the Supreme Court has effectively invented reasons and tortured logic to ensure outcomes to its liking. Bush v. Gore, anyone?
Marshall’s second objection contends that attempts to abolish the Electoral College would necessarily weaken states’ control over their own elections. He references an argument in Vox from Yale Law professor Akhil Amar, who once espoused a similar idea to NPVIC but sees flaws in the compact (paywalled; archive):
Which brings us back to Amar’s points about the weakness of the whole National Popular Vote Interstate Compact: the lack of any governing or oversight body to determine basic things like who actually won the popular vote. Read through Amar’s points and it’s clear that making the national popular vote work — either by abolishing the Electoral College by amendment or through the Compact — would require a significant federalization of elections. Given the experience of the last decade and especially the last two years, that seems like an unquestionably bad idea. Imagine how the last two years might have played out had national — inevitably executive branch — agencies held real governing power over the conduct of elections. Everything plays out very, very differently.
Federalizing elections is a terrible idea, yet I find Marshall’s (and Amar’s) argument that it’s the only way to reach consensus on a popular vote count unconvincing.
States already record, certify, and publicly release their vote counts. Not only are vote counts public information, they appear on the state certifications used by the Electoral College itself. Determining the popular vote winner requires only “ordinary arithmetic applied to the officially certified vote counts that existing federal law requires every state to provide and that every state already routinely produces.”
