I’m sorry, that’s wrong. That should be “Trump Celebrates Immigration Arrest of Columbia Student, Vows to Target Others.”

We regret the error.

That headline is from the Washington Post story covering Mahmoud Khalil’s “arrest” (a word meant to lend a veneer of legality):

Jameel Jaffer, executive director of the Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia, called Khalil’s arrest “genuinely shocking.”

“Arresting and threatening to deport students because of their participation in political protest is the kind of action one ordinarily associates with the world’s most repressive regimes,” he said. “Universities must recognize that these actions pose an existential threat to academic life itself. They must make clear, through action, that they will not sit on the sidelines as the Trump administration terrorizes students and faculty alike and runs roughshod over individual rights and the rule of law.”

Repressive regimes is overly polite. Brutal dictatorships seems more accurate.

Let me be clear: Regardless of your “politics”—whether you agree or disagree with what Mahmoud Khalil was protesting—detaining, arresting, and disappearing a legal American resident is a violation of due process and the First Amendment. It is an act of aggression against this country and its citizens (and legal residents), and it won’t stop with just Khalil, nor with people who engage in, as Trump sees it, “pro-terrorist, anti-Semitic, anti-American activity.”

The regime’s justification for this chilling action is based on a broad interpretation of the law:

The administration did not publicly lay out the legal authority for the arrest. But two people with knowledge of the matter, who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive internal deliberations, said Secretary of State Marco Rubio relied on a provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act that gives him sweeping power to expel foreigners.

The provision says any "alien whose presence or activities in the United States the Secretary of State has reasonable ground to believe would have potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences for the United States is deportable."

Taken to its extreme—and no, Khalil’s snatching is not yet the extreme—the Trump regime could use this interpretation to detain and expel any green card or visa holder. You disagree with Trump’s threats to invade Canada, Greenland, or Panama, his Ukraine policies, or simply enjoy mocking him? That’s a serious adverse foreign policy consequence for the United States. Begone.

That’s not even the end of it. Even naturalized citizens (hi!) can have their citizenship revoked. One reason your citizenship can be revoked?

[…] if the U.S. government can prove that you joined a subversive organization within five years of becoming a naturalized citizen. Subversive organizations are groups deemed to be threats to U.S. national security. Examples include the Nazi Party and Al Qaeda.

Guess who gets to determine what a “subversive organization” is? How long before the Democratic Party itself is deemed “subversive”? There is supposed to be due process, of course, but due process is clearly not much of a deterrent for this regime.

First undocumented immigrants.

Then green card holders.

Then birthright citizens.

Then naturalized citizens.

Then you.

Two weeks ago, Joseph Menn at The Washington Post reported that the United Kingdom had secretly demanded that Apple create a backdoor into iCloud, not just for UK residents, but worldwide, for all of Apple’s customers.

The uproar was nearly universal in its condemnation for its authoritarian overreach. When I linked to it last week (under the headline U.K. Government Wants to Spy on Every Apple Device in the World), I noted:

It’s extraordinary for the U.K. to demand this disastrous, privacy-wrecking access for its own citizens. It’s beyond audacious to do so for the 2.35 billion Apple devices in use in the world.

In an apparent response to the news story, Apple provided this statement to several outlets:

Apple can no longer offer Advanced Data Protection (ADP) in the United Kingdom to new users and current UK users will eventually need to disable this security feature. ADP protects iCloud data with end-to-end encryption, which means the data can only be decrypted by the user who owns it, and only on their trusted devices. We are gravely disappointed that the protections provided by ADP will not be available to our customers in the UK given the continuing rise of data breaches and other threats to customer privacy. Enhancing the security of cloud storage with end-to-end encryption is more urgent than ever before. Apple remains committed to offering our users the highest level of security for their personal data and are hopeful that we will be able to do so in the future in the United Kingdom. As we have said many times before, we have never built a backdoor or master key to any of our products or services and we never will.

(Hold onto that link. I’ll get back to it in a moment.)

It’s certainly better for Apple to outright disable ADP for its UK customers, rather than weaken it for everyone in the world. The former reflects the status quo: your iCloud data is encrypted, but Apple—and therefore governments, upon request—can gain access. The latter asks Apple to mislead its customers—lie—about a feature whose primary selling point is “No one else can access your end-to-end encrypted data, not even Apple,” while also granting unfettered, uncontrolled, undisclosed access to every customer’s private data.

From Apple’s perspective, it was a no-brainer.

It also, conveniently, shifts the blame squarely onto the UK government. Your data is less secure than it could be because of them.

Of course, disabling ADP for UK customers does not address the underlying concern: the demand was for access to all devices worldwide, not just those of UK residents. That demand still stands, Apple remains subject to it, and ADP remains available to non-UK customers.

This move also provides no assurance that Apple won’t (be forced to) create a backdoor in the future.

So why bother pulling it in the UK? I think Apple is sending a very subtle, tightly calibrated message that indirectly acknowledges the UK’s pressure without explicitly stating it.

Let’s look back at the statement Apple provided, and the link they included:

As we have said many times before, we have never built a backdoor or master key to any of our products or services and we never will.

That link is to Apple’s Government Information Requests page, which explains the types of requests they get from governments, and how they respond to them.

It also contains, as of February 21, 2025, the following clear and unambiguous statement (screenshot):

Apple has never created a backdoor or master key to any of our products or services. We have also never allowed any government direct access to Apple servers. And we never will.

This is a clear warrant canary and Apple is conspicuously drawing our attention to it—the most they can likely do without violating a secret gag order.

I’d wager the reason Apple pulled ADP in the UK in the first place was precisely so they could put out this very statement, thus implicitly acknowledging the UK demands are accurate, and putting those customers—and the rest of the world—on notice that something is going on there. They can’t say what, because of legal constraints, but: clearly UK-based, clearly related to end-to-end encryption. It’s left to us to draw the (obvious) conclusions.

Apple has a second, equally insidious problem though. If they were to concede to the UK’s preposterous demands for a secret backdoor to every device worldwide, every government that wants to spy on their citizens will pass—and enforce—similar laws. Clearly this would be untenable.

Yet, by defiantly disabling ADP in the UK, Apple provided every government in the world another path: apply the right pressure, and Apple will disable ADP for you. You run the play, it’s in the playbook.

Am I being overly cynical or naïve to suggest this irrational request was a ploy from the UK to eliminate full end-to-end encryption and keep their current access?

Perhaps.

But I’ll suggest it anyway.

There’s a mistaken belief in some circles that Apple pulled all end-to-end encryption for UK customers. They haven’t. Only the data covered by Advanced Data Protection—an opt-in, off-by-default feature—is impacted by this move. Everything else that was previously end-to-end encrypted—passwords, health data, Messages in iCloud, and so on—remains end-to-end encrypted, but, the encryption key is stored with Apple, so while your data is E2EE, it’s also viewable by Apple—and therefore by governments. This is how everything worked before Advanced Data Protection was announced in December 2019. Which is to say, governments already had access to your iCloud data, in or out of the UK, unless you have ADP enabled.

Governments are desperately trying to forestall the move to full end-to-end encryption. The access they have today may not be comprehensive, but it gets them some of the most sensitive customer data, upon (legal) request.

The status quo ante doesn’t gain the UK any additional access, but—crucially—they don’t lose the access they currently have. Demanding secret entrée to every Apple device worldwide is so outrageous, it can’t have been their real goal. It’s looks like an intimidation tactic, one with such dire consequences that it simply could not be ignored. It is, in the end, a warning: Kill ADP, or “full iCloud access” will be the least of our demands.

I believe Apple would like nothing more than to be able to say “we have no way to grant access to customers’ data”. I’m confident they would make ADP the default if they could, and the reason they haven’t is primarily out of concern for their customers, who could lose access to their data if they lose access to their accounts or devices—the same reason I believe most customers haven’t enabled it (along with a naïve belief that only criminals are targeted by the government).

But keeping ADP opt-in rather making it the default may also act as a hedge against backdoor demands, buying Apple time to boost public support (and awareness) for stronger encryption options.

But here’s Apple’s conundrum: They’re subject to the laws of the countries in which they operate, and those countries hold surprising sway over them, because, as I noted in my earlier piece:

… governments are recognizing they can coerce Apple via threats of sales bans, catastrophic fines, or tariffs.

Or, I’ll add, existential attacks on a fundamental Apple value.

My wish would be for Apple to take itself out of the E2EE equation completely: enable Advanced Data Protection by default. Once enabled, Apple can’t disable it—only the customer can do so. Apple can throw up their hands when approached by an overreaching government: Sorry, old chap, nothing we can do. Pip pip, cheerio.

I know they’d never do this, though. It’s a provocative move, one likely to trigger immediate legal backlash. Even with privacy, I doubt there’s a bright red line that Apple would never cross and would make them walk away from a market. Principles usually take a backseat to profits, eventually. Apple remains subject to government coercion until and unless they’re willing give up money—an action I seriously doubt they’d ever take. And governments know it.